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The Rhetoric and Reality of Regulatory Reform
Cary Coglianese t
1
Executive Order (E. O. ) 13,422 leaves in place most of the ex1stmg
review process established earlier under Presidents Reagan through Clinton. 2
But it makes several controversial changes to Clinton's E.O., such as requiring
that agencies specify in writing the regulatory problems they seek to solve,
giving presidential appointees certain gatekeeping functions as Regulatory
Policy Officers, and imposing new review requirements on certain guidance
documents. 3 Although these amendments add or modify only a very small
amount of the text in the pre-existing Executive Order on regulatory review, the
changes have provoked a firestorm. Critics charge that the new Order solidifies
presidential control over rulemaking and will hamper agencies' ability to issue
timely regulations in the service of social welfare.
In this Essay, I focus specifically on the concern that the Order will
burden and delay the regulatory process. I compare the criticisms of E . O.
13,422 with criticisms of past procedural changes to the regulatory process, and
I juxtapose the perennial concern about administrative burdens and delay with
the growth in federal regulation over the past half-century. If procedural
controls, such as those in E.O. 13,422, really do impose on regulatory agencies
a "paralysis by analysis," then why is the federal government still producing so
many high-impact regulations? This Essay raises possible explanations for the
disjunction between the rhetoric and reality surrounding regulatory reform,
including the possibility that the ultimate impact of the Bush amendments will
be largely symbolic.

t Edward B. Shils Professor of Law and Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania Law
School; Director, Penn Program on Regulation. The author is grateful for research support provided by
Jocelyn D'Ambrosio and Tim Yon Dulm, comments on an earlier draft from Matthew Adler. Jocelyn
D'Ambrosio, Stuart Shapiro, Natalya Shnitser, and Christopher Yoo, and the assistance of the joumal 's
editorial staff.
I

Exec. OrderNo. 13,422, 72 Fed. Reg. 2763 ( Jan. 18, 2007).

2
Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993}, reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2000); Exec.
Order No. 1 2,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982). Executive Order 1 2,29 1 was issued by President Reagan on
Febmary 17, 198 1 , while Executive Order 1 2,866 was issued by President Clinton on September 30,
1993.
In addition to these changes, E.O. 13,422 also includes provisions about reporting
3
cumulative regulatory benefits and costs as well as about the use of fonnal rulemaking procedures.
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I. Rhetoric Reacting to E.O. 13,422
For a short presidential decree on administrative rulemaking, E.O. 13,422
has received a remarkable degree of public attention, including a front-page
5
4
story in The New York Times, a broadcast on M SNBC, and two congressional
6
hearings -not to mention the passage of a House appropriations bill blocking
its implementation. 7 In the course of the highly visible debate over E. O.
13,422, critics have advanced two rhetorical arguments. The first emphasizes
the balance of power between Congress and the President, tapping into broader
critiques of the Bush administration's positions on executive authority in
domestic and foreign affairs. 8 The second, and the one on which I focus here, is
a variation on what economist Albert Hirschman calls the "rhetoric of
9
jeopardy. "
E.O. 13,422, the argument goes, "deals a body blow to the ability of our

agencies to do their jobs." 10 Its requirement that agencies state the problem

they seek to solve imposes "another hurdle for agencies to clear" before they
can adopt good public policies "protecting public health and safety." 11 Its
provisions on guidance documents give the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) the ability "to keep the agencies in an endless loop of analysis and

4
Robert Pear, Bush Directive Increases Sway on Regulation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2007, at
A I (reporting that "[c]onsumer, labor, and environmental groups denounced the executive order" and
feared that it "would hinder agencies' efforts to protect the public").

5
Countdown with Keith Olbermann: Executive Order 13,422 (MSNBC television broadcast
Jan. 30, 2007), available at http://olbermannnation.com/index.php/2007/0 l /30/executive_order_l3,422

and http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sz6NEoKZRMY (conversation between host Keith Olbermann
and guest John Dean highlighting potentially "outrageous" consequences of E.O. 1 3 ,422, including its
"hurdles" for new regulatory actions).

There have been at least two congressional hearings so far. The House Science and
6
Technology Committee's Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight held hearings on February 13,
2007 and April 26, 2007. See Amending Executive Order 12.866: Good Governance or Regulat01y
Usurpation? Parts 1 and II: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Investigation and Oversight of the H.

on Sci. & Tech., 11Oth Cong. ( 2007), available at http://democrats.science.house.gov/
pub I ications/hearings_markups_details.aspx?NewsiD=1269 and http://democrats.science. house.gov/
pub I ications/hearings_markups_details.aspx?NewsiD= 1777.
Comm.

7
Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act of 2008 § 901, H.R. 2829,
!lOth Cong. (2007). The Senate did not pass similar legislation.
8

See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, Overseer or "The Decider"? The President in Administrative

Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV 696, 732-38 (2007).
.

9
ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, THE RHETORIC OF REACTION: PERVERSITY, FUTILITY, JEOPARDY
84 (1 991). Although Hirschman focuses most of his attention on the rhetoric of conservatives, he readily
acknowledges that progressives make parallel rhetorical moves. !d. at 149-54 (labeling the progressives'
parallel to the jeopardy argument the "imminent danger thesis"). Conservatives' rhetoric of jeopardy
emphasizes the dangers of action, while progressives' parallel rhetoric of imminent danger focuses on
the dangers of inaction. !d. at 1 53.
I0

Amending Executive Order 12.866: Good Governance o r Regulato1y Usurpation? Part !:

Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Investigation & Oversight of the H. Comm. on Sci. & Tech., 11 Oth

Cong. (2007) (statement of David C. Vladeck, Associate Professor, Georgetown University Law
available
ar
http :1/democrats.science.house.gov/Media/File/Commdocs/hearings/2007I
Center),
oversight/1 3feb/vladeck_testimony.pdf.
II

86

Pear, supra note 4 (quoting Gary D. Bass, Executive Director of OMB Watch).
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[will] lead to endless regulatory delays."

12

The Order's relatively obscure, if

somewhat puzzling, provision on formal mlemaking procedures causes at least
one prominent administrative law scholar to wonder if its purpose is "[j]ust to
help one's friends slow things down-throw a good dose of sand into the gears
.
of m I emak mg. "13
14
According to critics, E . O. 13,422 generates "gridlock"
or "a new
16
15
It "codifies regulatory delay" -and hence "lead[s]
bureaucratic bottleneck. "
17
to the further ossification of an already overburdened administrative process. "
One member of Congress claims E. O. 13,422 provides "another avenue for
special interests to slow down and prevent agencies from protecting the
18
Still another declares that it "make[s] it harder for agencies to take
19
virtually any action."
A former OMB regulatory policy administrator predicts

public. "

that due to E.O. 13,422, along with recent OMB bulletins and standards, "fewer
20
regulations can be issued."

12
OMB WATCH, A FAILURE TO GOVERN: BUSH'S ATTACK ON THE REGULATORY PROCESS
22 (2007), http://www.ombwatch.org/regs/PDFs/FailuretoGovern.pdf. Even an otherwise supportive
treatment of E.O. 13,422 expresses concern that the revised "process could slow or stop the issuance of
some guidance that serves a useful social purpose." Amending Executive Order 12,866: Good
Governance or Regulat01y Usurpation? Part II: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Investigation &

Oversight of the H. Comm. on Sci. & Tech., liOth Cong. 4 (2007) (statement of Robert W. Hahn,
President, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies), available at http://democrats.
science. house. gov/Media/File/Comm docs/hearings/2007Ioversight/2 6apr/hahn testimony. pdf.

13

Amending Executive Order 12,866: Good Governance or Regulatory Usurpation? Part II:

Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Investigation & Oversight of the H. Comm. on Sci. & Tech., 1 10th

Cong. 12 (2007) (Statement of Peter L. Strauss, Professor, Columbia University School of Law),
available at http :1Idemocrats. science.house. gov/Media/Fi le/Commdocs/hearings/2 007Ioversight/2 6apr/
strauss_testimony.pdf.
14
Union of Concerned Scientists, Presidential Mandate Centralizes Regulatory Power,
Endangers Citizens, http://www.ucsusa.org/scientific_integritylinterference/executive-order.html (last
visited Nov. 18, 2007).
15

PUBLIC CITlZEN, LATEST WHITE HOUSE POWER GRAB PUTS PUBLIC AT RISK: PROBLEMS

2007
EXECUTIVE
ORDER
AND
BULLETIN
http://www. citizen. org/documents/new-eo-and-guidance-overview. pdf.
OF

THE

16

JAN.

ON

GUIDANCE

2

(2007),

OMB WATCH, UNDERMINING PUBLIC PROTECTIONS: PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF THE

AMENDMENTS TO EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,866 ON REGULATORY PLANNING AND REVIEW 3 (2007),

available at http://www.ombwatch.org/regs/EO l 2866_amendments_analysis.pdf.

17

Vladeck, supra note 10, at 19.

18
Press Release, Subcomm. on Investigation & Oversight of the H. Comm. on Sci. & Tech.,
Miller Leads Subcommittee Hearing into White House Exec. Order that Gives More Political Control
Over Public Health, Safety Regulations (Feb. 13, 2007), available at http://democrats.
science.house.gov/press/PRArticle.aspx?NewsiD=l 328 (quoting Rep. Brad Miller).
19
20

153 CONG. REC. E 1438, E 1438 (June 28, 2007) (statement of Rep. Waxman).

Amending Executive Order 12,866: Good Governance or Regulat01y Usurpation? Part I:

Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Investigation & Oversight of the H. Comm. on Sci. & Tech., l l Oth
Cong. 9 (2007) (statement of Sally Katzen, Adjunct Professor, University of Michigan Law School),
available at http://democrats.science. house.gov/Medial/File/Commdocs/hearings/2007/oversight/ 13 feb/
katzen_testimony.pdf.
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II. Rhetoric and Reaction in Administrative Law
The kinds of criticisms that have been leveled against E. O. 13,422 are
hardly new. Burdens and delays have figured prominently in the rhetoric
against a variety of administrative law reforms. When President Reagan first
21

established formal White House review of rulemaking under E.O. 12,29 1,

critics raised separation of powers questions, 22 but they also complained that

OMB review would impede agencies' ability to make new regulations. 23 A
widely cited article published in the Harvard Law Review during the Reagan
years declared that "OMB control imposes costly delays that are paid for
4
through the decreased health and safety of the American public."2 Even after
President Clinton changed the Reagan Order to reserve OMB review for a more
limited set of significant rules and to place time limits on the review process, 25
scholars continue to claim that OMB review slows down the regulatory
6
process, and even grinds it to a halt in certain instances. 2

21

Exec. OrderNo.\2,291,3 C.F.R.I27 (198 1).

22

See. e.g. , Morton Rosenberg, Bevond the Limits of Executive Power: Presidential Control

ofAgenc_v Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12.291, 80 MICH. L. REV. 193 ( 198 1).

23
Felicity Barringer, If Rules Are ;'vfade to Be Broken, So Are Rulemakers, WASH. POST, June
25, 1981, at A21 (describing the Reagan Order as "requiring further delays and studies of all pending
rules"); Philip Shabecoff, Reagan Order on Cost-Benefit Analysis Stirs Economic and Political Debate,
N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 198 1, at 28 (noting that the Reagan administration had issued only about thirty new
major regulations compared with "I 00 to 200 such major regulations" in previous years, and quoting
observers who suggested that OMB review was "stemming regulation" and serving as a means to
"obstruct regulations"); see also Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review
of Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075, 1087-88 ( 1986) ("[M]ost criticism has focused . . . on
the delay that OMB review entails."); OMB Watch, OMB Control of Rulemaking: The End of Public
Access 13 (Aug. 1985) (on file with author) ("The required cost/benefit analyses impose[) often heavy
burdens on the regulatory agencies."). Even earlier efforts of presidential oversight were said to obstruct
rulemaking. See id. at 3 (stating thatNixon's "[h)ighly controversial" review process stood "accused of
delaying the already lengthy environmental regulatory process").
24

Alan B. Morrison, OMB lntetference with Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way To Write a

Regulation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1064 ( 1986). Publishing in the same issue of the Harvard Lmv
Review, Christopher DeMuth and Douglas Ginsburg lauded OMB review because it "encourages policy
coordination, greater political accountability, and more balanced regulatory decisions." DeMuth &
Ginsburg, supra note 23, atI08 I. DeMuth and Ginsburg both served as Administrators of the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs within OMB. DeMuth & Ginsburg, supra at 1075. Their claims, and
those of other supporters of OMB review, can and should be scrutinized along with the claims of
critics-especially since empirical studies generally "have failed to show that economic analysis and
OMB review have significant effects on the cost-effectiveness of government regulations." Cary
Coglianese, Empirical Analysis and Administrative L{rw, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1111, 1 123 (2002); see
also id. at 1 123 nn.54-57 (citing studies of the impact of economic analysis on regulatory decisions).

25
The Reagan Executive Order required agencies to submit all rules to OM B for review.
Exec. Order No. 12,29 1 § § 3 (c)(3), 3 (e)(2)(C}, 3 (1)(2). In contrast, the Clinton Executive Order only
f cant rules to OMB. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C. F.R. 638 §�
required agencies to submit signii
6(a)(3)(A), 6(a)(3)(B), 6(b)(l) (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S. C. § 601 (2000). Furthermore, unlike the
Reagan Order, the Clinton Order stated that when reviewing proposed and final rules "OIRA shall .
notify the agency in writing of the results of its review . . . within 90 calendar days." ld § 6(b)(2).
26
See, e. g., Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twentv-First Century, 78 N. Y.U.
L. REV. 437, 447 (2003) ("OMB regulatory analysis and other forms of regulatory impact review have
also contributed to 'paralysis by analysis.' Agencies increasingly tum to less formal, less accountable,
and more opaque methods of making regulatory policy."). It has even been said that "OMB's review of
agency rulemaking has proved far more intmsive during the 1980s and early 1990s than either judicial

88
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OMB review is not the only procedure to stand accused of obstruction.
What critics say about OMB generally, and E. O. 13,422 specifically, mirrors
the charges leveled against many other administrative procedures. For example,
environmental impact statements required by the National Environmental
Policy Act purportedly postpone many federal actions. 27 The Freedom of
Information Act allegedly imposes high costs on federal agencies. 23 Critics of
recent proposals for peer review and other checks on information quality claim
that they will unduly delay regulatory policymaking. 29 It has become widely
accepted that judicial review under the arbitrary and capricious standard has
"burdened,

dislocated,

and

ultimately

paralyzed"

certain

agencies'

rulemaking. 30
"Paralysis by analysis" has become a cliche in regulatory circles today. 3 1
This appealing rhyme, though, is itself far from new, dating at least to the first
half of the twentieth century when it appeared in sermons and other religious

or congressional review." Thomas 0. McGarity. Some Thoughts on 'Deossi(ying
Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385. 1429 (1992).
27

See.

e. g.. Sharon Buccino, NEPA Under Assault:

··

the Rulemaking

Congressional and Administrative

Proposals Would Weaken Environmental Review and Public Participation, 12 N. Y.U. ENVT L. L.J. 50,

52 (2003) ("Some critics blame theNEPA process for delay and inefficiency."): Bradley C. Karkkainen,
Toward a Smarter NEPA: J'vfonitoring and Managing Govemment's Environmental Pe1jormance, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 903. 906-07 (2002) (stating that NEPA "demands the impossible" and "places extreme
demands on agency resources"); James T.B. Tripp & Nathan G. Alley. Streamlining NEPA 's
Environmental Review Process: Suggestions for Agencv Reform, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 74, 75 (2003)
(" [C]ommentators and the agencies bound by (NEPA's] requirements have often decried the Act as a
time- and resource-consuming annoyance.").
28
See, e. g. , Antonin Scalia, The Freedom oflnjonnation Act Has No Clothes. REGULATION,
Mar.-Apr. 1982, at 14, 15-1 6 (describing that FOIA requests "have greatly burdened investigative
agencies and the courts"). Scalia's argument against FOIA, along with criticisms of delays caused by
NEPA, suggest how arguments about the burden of administrative procedures can cut across ideological
lines.
29

See. e.g. , Thomas 0. McGarity, Our Science Is Sound Science and Their Science Is Junk

Science: Science-Based Strategies )or Avoiding Accountability and Responsibi/itv for Risk-Producing

Products and Activities, 52 KAN. L. REV. 897, 935 (2004) (arguing that ''the result [of the Information

Quality Act] can only be added expense and delay in the decisionmaking process"); J.B. Ruhl & James
Salzman, In Defense of Regulatorv Peer Review, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. I, 6 (2006) (quoting a critic of
peer review who predicted that regulatory peer review will "introduce potentially massive costs and
delay, thus injecting paralysis by analysis into the regulatory process").
30

Jerry

L. Mashaw

& David

Harfst,

Inside

the

National

Higlnmv

Traffic

Saf'ety

Administration: Legal Determinants of Bureaucratic Organization and Performance, 57 U. CHI. L. REV.

443. 443 (1990). See also Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, I 0 I
MICH. L. REV. 885, 932 (2003) ("[Judicial] review has contributed to the 'ossification' of notice-and
comment rulemaking, which now takes years, in pa11 as a result of the effort to fend off judicial
challenges. In light of the risk of invalidation, many agencies have turned away from notice-and
comment rulemaking altogether '').
31
See. e.g. , Daniel A. Farber, Rethinking Regulatmy Reform A.fier American Trucking, 23
PACE L. REV. 43, 51 (2002) ("Environmentalists respond that cost-benefit analysis is a recipe for
'paralysis by analysis. "'); Thomas 0. McGarity, The APA at Fijiy: The Expanded Debate over the
Furure of' the Regularorv State, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1463, 1523 ( 1996) (noting the "fear that many of the
cognitive regulatory refonns . . will lead to 'paralysis by analysis"'); Chris Mooney, Paralysis bv
Analvsis, WASH. MONTHLY, May 2004, at 23, available at http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/
features/2004/0405. mooney. html.
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writings. 32 The underlying concern the rhyme conveys about administrative
process also dates back to the early part of the last century. In an article
published in the Harvard Law Review in 1938, an administrative law scholar

·�
l
�

1

j

1

1

asked whether New Deal changes in rulemaking procedures would lead at least
33
to "a partial paralysis ...by reason of excessive formality and litigation."

l

At the time of the New Deal, proposals for government-wide procedural
34
reform triggered the "fear of unduly hampering" agencies. Of course, today

l

the informal rulemaking provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
35
of 1946 are held up as a model of administrative simplicity and efficiency,
only to have been spoiled by developments in judicial and regulatory oversight
36
It is little known that the APA was itself once

in the last several decades.

viewed as a major source of ossification. Scholars in the 1940s feared that its
uniform

procedures would "severely cramp the style of government
37
regulation."
The right to file a rulemaking petition under § 553(e) was of

"doubtful value," especially since agencies could be "swamped by frivolous
38
It is hard to imagine now, but

requests having delay as their sole objective. "

at the time of the APA's adoption some academic observers forecasted
"disastrous" effects from the law, characterizing the Act as nothing short of a
39
"sabotage of the administrative process. "

32
See, e.g., ELI STANLEY JONES, THE CHRIST OF EVERY ROAD: A STUDY IN PENTECOST 40
(1 930). Although the phrase appears to have been employed most commonly by Christian writers and
preachers during the early part of the twentieth century, it came into more general usage after Martin
Luther King, Jr. made it part of his call for racial justice. See MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., STRENGTH TO
LOVE 17 ( 1963). The rhyme appeared within the pages of the Federal Register as early as in 1952, used
by a Republican appointee to the Federal Communications Commission. See Dissenting Opinion of
Comm'r Robert F. Jones, 17 Fed. Reg. 4093, 4094 (May 2, 1952) ("The Commission has had the
paralysis of analysis for I year, not consumed in drafting the general rules and standards [for television
service],but consumed in a search for a city-to-city allocation plan which it can freeze on the country by
rule-making proceedings. ").
Ralph F. Fuchs, Procedure in Administrative Rule-Making, 52 HARV. L. REV. 2 5 9, 280
33
(1 938).
34
E. Blythe Stason, Administrative Lmv-Developments: 1940-1945, 44 MICH. L. REv. 797,
803 (1 946).
KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 283 (1 970) (describing informal
35
rulemaking under the A P A as being among the "greatest inventions of modem government"). This
phrase of Davis's continues to be quoted today.

McGarity, supra note 26, at 1385 ("Professor Kenneth Culp Davis captured the prevailing
36
when he called informal rulemaking 'one of the greatest inventions of modern
sentiment
government. ' Twenty years later, the bloom is off the rose. . . . [The] rulemaking process has become
increasingly rigid and burdensome [due to an] assortment of analytical requirements . . . and evolving
judicial doctrines . . . . ") (citation omitted).
Fritz Morstein Marx, Some Aspects of Legal Work in Administrative Agencies, 96 U. PA. L.
37
REV. 354, 354 n.2 (1 948).
38
Foster H. Sherwood, The Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 4 1 AM. POL. Scr. R E V
271, 279 ( 1947).
39
Frederick F. Blachly & Miriam E. Oatman, Sabotage of the Administrative Process, 6 PUB.
ADMIN. REV. 213, 21 3 (1946).
.
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III. The Reality of Regulatory Growth
We have thus heard complaints about procedural burdens many times
before. What, then, should we make of the rhetorical similarities between
criticisms ofE.O. 13,422 and of administrative procedures more generally? The
perennial nature of the refrain about delay and obstruction might well make
anyone suspicious that the criticisms of E.O. 13,422 are nothing more than the
rhetorical ploy trotted out by the opponents of any reform. But as Hirschman
reminds us, the mere fact that a rhetorical argument is repeated or even
40
overused does not necessarily make it wrong.
The impact of OMB review,
with or without E.O. 13,422, is ultimately an empirical question that requires
41

looking at what agencies have actually done in terms of rulemaking.

Yet here i s where suspicions about the rhetoric o f paralysis grow
strongest, because the regulatory state has increased considerably in size and
impact since the establishment of the APA and subsequent reforms, including
OMB review. The sheer volume of rules, as measured by pages in the Code of
Federal Regulations (CFR), has increased about five times since 1946 and has
continued to grow since the advent of OMB review. For the past couple of
decades, the federal government has issued an average of about 4000 new rules
each year in the Federal Register. The 2006 CFR contains about 33% more
42
pages than did the 1980 volume of the CFR.
Pages of rules are only one way to measure regulatory activity. When
estimated monetarily, the impact of federal regulation has also increased. Not
only do new rules deliver substantial benefits to society, they also impose
substantial costs. According to the estimates collected by OMB during its
review process, government regulations issued since 1981 have imposed $ 127
43
billion in annual costs on the economy.
According to a retrospective study
conducted by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, the annual
costs attributable to mandatory federal auto safety standards have increased
from $255 per car during the 1968-78 period to $760 per car in the 199 1-200 1
44
An independent study has reported that
period, even controlling for inflation.

40

HIRSCHMAN, supra note 9, at 1 66.

41

See generally Coglianese, supra note 24.

The values reported in this paragraph draw on data on file with the author that were
42
collected by and obtained from the Office of the Federal Register. A recent study by Anne Joseph
O'Connell similarly "calls into question much of the existing debate on regulatory 'ossification'" and
reports data on rulemaking frequency that "strongly suggest that the administrative state is not ossified."
Anne Joseph O'Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait ol the Modern
Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REv. (forthcoming June 2008).
43

OFFICE OF tv!GMT. & BUDGET, D RAFT 2007 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND

BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS 34 (2007), http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/2007_cb/

2007 draft_cb_report.pdf. The same report indicates that annual average regulatory costs have tended to
be lower during the second Bush administration than during previous administrations, although of
course these data precede the issuance of E.O. 13,422. /d.
44
MARCIA J. TARBET, NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN .. COST AND WEIGHT
ADDED BY THE FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARDS FOR MODEL YEARS 1 968-2001 IN
PASSENGER CARS AND LIGHT TRUCKS 145 tbl.5 A (NHTSA Report No. DOT HS 809 834, 2004),
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the

annual

costs

associated

with

environmental

regulations

more

than

quadrupled between 1972 and 1992, roughly a decade before and a decade after

the establishment of OMB review. 45

Given the overall increase in pages of

regulation

and

their

costs,

government regulators have clearly not been paralyzed. Have they nevertheless
been hobbled? Is it possible that regulatory growth would have been greater
still in the absence of OMB review? Several empirical studies have tried to
determine whether OMB review slows down the rulemaking process, thus
making it harder for agencies to issue as many rules as they otherwise would.
Although it might seem intuitive that OMB review would increase the time and
expense of issuing new rules, researchers have not found systematic evidence
that OMB review imposes any significant delay on the regulatory process,
notwithstanding careful analysis of both large-sample datasets and matched
case studies. For example, political scientists Cornelius Kerwin and Scott
Furlong published a regression analysis of the determinants of EPA rulemaking
duration in which they found little by way of any statistically significant effect
46
from OMB review.
Stuart Shapiro, another social scientist, analyzed a series
of matched state agencies and found that even seemingly

cumbersome

rulemaking procedures, like economic analysis review, did not affect the rate of
regulatory change, although the partisan control of the political branches did.47
More recently, political scientist Steven Balla and his colleagues studied the
determinants of the duration of OMB review and found that, contrary to claims
that special interests try to capture OMB review to delay rules, reviews were
actually shorter when only narrow sets of businesses were in contact with

available at http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/cars/rules/regrev/Evaluate/809834.html (reporting all data on unit
costs in 2002 dollars).

45

Adam B. Jaffe et al., Environmental Regulation and the Competitiveness of U.S.

46

Cornelius M. Kerwin & Scott R. Furlong, Time and Ru/emaking: An Empirical Test o(

Manufacwring: What Does the Evidence Tell Us?, 33 J. E CON . LIT. 1 32, 1 40 (1995).

Theorv, 2 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 113 (1992). The Kerwin and Furlong study analyzed

determinants of the duration of !50 non-routine EPA rules issued during the period from October I .
1986 through September 30, 1989, drawing o n data collected from the EPA's internal regulatory
management system. !d. at 122. The authors repot1ed results from three separate regression models. In
two of these models, the OMB review variable was not significant at all. /d. at 130. In the model of
duration between proposed and final rules, OMB review was statistically significant. but only had an
effect that for every day a rule was under OMB review, the duration of the process was lengthened by
two days. !d. Even with this one apparent statistical relationship, the variable for OMB review could be
serving as at least a partial proxy for the overall complexity or political salience of mles. !d. at 132. In
other words,at least part of any statistically observed delay may stem from the fact that mles that go to
OMB for review are simply more complex and controversial to begin with than the ordinary rule.
47

Stuart Shapiro, Speed Bumps and Roadblocks: Procedural Controls and Regularon·

Change, 12 J. PUB. ADMIN. REs. & THEORY 29 (2002). Shapiro studied day care regulation in eight

states, selecting states in pairs that otherwise were geographically and economically similar. He chose to
study day care regulation because it is a domain that has largely escaped federal preemption, thus
helping to maximize the possibility of variation across states. Contrary to prior expectations. Shapiro
found that regulators in states with purportedly cumbersome regulatory procedures were not deterred
from issuing new regulations. Instead, he found that the key determinant of the level of regulatory
activity was the political environment within the states. When the political alignment in the legislature
and executive branch favored regulatory change, change generally occutTed, even in states with higher
procedural hurdles. !d.
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OMB. 48 To be sure, no broad-based empirical study can rule out that OMB
review might have the effect of slowing the issuance of an individual rule now
and then. The existing work does fail, though, to find clear evidence of any
general effects consistent with the general rhetorical claims made about OMB
.

review.

49

IV. Explaining the Rhetoric-Reality Divergence
How, then, can the bold rhetoric about E.O. 13,422 and OMB review be
reconciled with the stark reality of continued and substantial outflows of
regulation from the federal government? Perhaps additional research is needed
to uncover the real, but more subtle, effects that procedures like these have on
regulatory behavior. Or, perhaps OMB review truly has failed to delay
rulemaking so far, but the implementation of E.O.

13,422 will take the

administrative process past a tipping point to where rulemaking does finally
begin to slow down, if not grind to a standstill. Or perhaps ultimately the
50
rhetoric surrounding E.O. 13,422 and OMB review is just that: rhetoric.
These are all certainly possibilities. But I find more interesting three other
possible explanations that might offer theoretical insights about the relationship
between administrative procedures and regulatory decisionmaking. The first
possibility might be that administrative procedures like E.O.

13,422 are

epiphenomenal, or at least so highly malleable to make them merely symbolic.
That is, rulemaking procedures may look like they impose burdens on agencies,
but the real burdens depend entirely on whether or how they are implemented,

48

Steven J. Balla et al., Outside Participation and OMB Review of Agency Regulations (Apr.

21, 2006) (unpublished paper presented at the annual Midwest Pol. Sci. Ass'n meeting) (on file with the
author). The authors examined nearly 2000 OMB reviews undertaken from 2002 through 2004 to
determine whether contacts between OMB and outside parties over specific rules tended to correspond
with the duration of OMB review of those rules. /d. at 6. Based on OMB logs of staff contact with
outside parties, the authors reported that contacts took place in only about 7% of the rules. !d. Although
reviews where contacts occurred did take longer on average than reviews without any contacts, once
other variables were controlled for, contacts with business groups were not associated with a
lengthening

of

the

OMB

review

process.

As

Balla

et

al.

state,

"contrary

to

widely

held

expectations[,) ... outside communications do not operate in a way that particularly advantages business

firms and trade associations seeking to derail prospective agency regulations." !d. at 15.
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See MATTHEW D. ADLER & ER IC A. POSNER. NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT

ANALYSIS 87 (2006) (noting that "existing evidence and the political economy of rulemaking call into

question the claim that [cost-benefit analysis) produces substantial incremental delay"). In one recent
paper, two political scientists report results suggesting that OMB review can "actually speed up agency
rulemaking-a finding directly contrary to what ossification theory predicts." Jason W. Yackee & Susan

W. Yackee, Is Federal Agency Rulemaking "Ossified?" The Effects of Procedural Constraints on
Agency Policymaking 24 (Apr. 14, 2007) (unpublished paper presented at the annual Midwest Pol. Sci.
Ass'n meeting) (on file with the author).
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See

CURTIS W. COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., REPORT NO. RL33862, CHANGES

TO THE OMB R EGULATORY REVIEW PROCESS BY EXECUTIVE ORDER 13422. at CRS-5 (2007), available

at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33862.pdf

(noting that

"concerns

about

the

usurpation

of

congressional standards for rulemaking and unnecessary delay may be exaggerated"); see also Stuart
Shapiro, The Role of Procedural Controls in OSHA's Ergonomics Rulemaking, 67 Pus. ADMIN. REV.
688. 697 (2007) (describing the limited, even symbolic, role of various procedural steps in the
development of OSHA's ergonomics rule in the 1990s).
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not on the existence of procedure qua procedure. As a result, an administration
that wants to regulate a lot will regulate a lot, and an administration that wants
to slow down regulation will slow down regulation, regardless of what
procedures are on the books. 5 1
A second possible account i s that the behavioral effect o f a law or
procedure is real, rather than illusory, but just simply trivial (at least for certain
effects of interest). For example, even if state laws requiring consumers to pay
a five-cent deposit for soda bottles and cans reduce roadside litter and increase
recycling, it is hard to see that these so-called bottle bills place any meaningful
barrier in the way of the purchase of soda, and hence it seems unlikely they
would lead to any discernible decline in soda sales in states after these laws are
adopted. 52 In a similar vein, some administrative procedures probably have
only trivial effects on rulemaking because agencies can satisfy them by
publishing boilerplate language in their Federal Register notices. If agencies
come to satisfy E.O. 13,422's new written problem statement requirement
using boilerplate language or

by creating check-boxes on

a

form,

the

requirement's impact will surely be inconsequential in terms of the pace and
cost of rulemaking.
A third possibility is that procedures do have both real and consequential
effects, but these effects are drowned out by other behavioral factors moving in
the same direction. For instance, on the assumption that Reagan's regulatory
review order was truly more burdensome than Clinton's Order, 53 the additional
burden may not have had much of an effect on agency behavior in an
administration where appointees were already less inclined to regulate. If it
turned out that agencies issued fewer or less costly rules during the Reagan
administration than the Clinton administration, these results may well have
stemmed not so much from procedure than from the ideology of the political
appointees heading the agencies.
For much the same reason, if other legal rules, professional norms, or
political exigencies already are pushing agencies to take benefit-cost analysis
54
-then any additional,

seriously-something Cass Sunstein has suggested

incremental stringency of a regulatory review order may yield at best only a

51
Stuart Shapiro has suggested as much, concluding that "the new regulatory procedures [put
in place during the Bush-II administration] may either be irrelevant to regulatory outcomes or may be
used by future pro-regulatory presidents to achieve their own regulatory goals." Stuart Shapiro,
Presidents and Process: A Comparison of the Regulat01y Process Under the Clinton and Bush (43)
Administrations 22 (AE!-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, Working Paper No. 06-30,

2006), available at
RP06-30_topost. pdf.

http://aei-brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/redirect -safely.php?fname=. ./pdffi les/

In other words. while a price increase can have real effects on purchasing behavior, it
52
would be hard to imagine the demand for soda is so highly elastic that a five-cent deposit has anything
but the most trivial effect on overall sales.
53
See supra note 25. For a further discussion of some of the differences between the Reagan
and Clinton Orders, see Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical
Investigation, 70 U. CHI. L. RE V 821,827-29,849-50 (2003).
.
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small and diminishing behavioral return. In other words, if agencies are
already, for other reasons, engaging in exactly the kind of analysis called for by
the new Executive Order, the Order will impose no (or negligible) additional
costs and delays. To predict the extent of any delay from E.O. 13,422' s
provisions on guidance documents, for example, w e need to know more about
what analysis of these non-binding documents agencies conduct anyway. It
would not be surprising to discover that many agencies already conduct
analysis of their most significant guidance documents, precisely the ones
covered by the new Executive Order. If this is true, the additional time and
effort needed to satisfy OMB review under E.O. 13,422 will most certainly tum
out to be much smaller than has been widely imagined. 5 5

V. Conclusion
For these reasons, scholars and policy decisionmakers should exercise
caution before concluding that E . O. 13,422 will have anything more than the
most minor effects on actual agency operations. The Order's requirement for a
written problem statement and its provisions calling for OMB review of
guidance documents, for example, may well be easily met or add only
superfluously to what agencies already do.

Such an outcome would be

consistent with the longstanding disjunction between the rhetoric and reality of
regulatory reform. Alarms of delay and paralysis have sounded in response to
nearly

every

major

regulatory

Administrative Procedure Act of

reform

since

the

establishment

of

the

1946-and yet the regulatory state has

nevertheless marched rather dramatically onward over the last six decades.
As it applies to the operation of government bureaucracies, administrative
law

is

embedded

within

a

complex

web

of

politics,

institutions,

and

organizational behavior. Within this web, law is but one factor influencing
behavior in government agencies among a variety of institutional, professional,
social, financial, and political factors that interact with each other, and even
adapt and change over time. Social scientists who have devoted their careers to
the empirical study of bureaucracy have yet to create a parsimonious theory of

bureaucratic behavior. 56 Their failure to do so, combined with the obvious

expansion of regulation in the face of repeated warnings to the contrary, should
make both institutional designers and their critics more circumspect about their
predictions-and their rhetoric-concerning the impact of regulatory reform.
55
Moreover, OMS's review of significant guidance documents may tum out to be much
more limited than critics apparently assume it will be. See OMB Regulatory Policy Chief Anticipates
New Draft of Risk Assessment Guidance, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA), at A-24 (May I 0, 2007)
(quoting OMB regulatory director Susan Dudley anticipating that review of guidance documents will be
"a quick turnaround thing . . . not the same as [reviewing] a regulation"). If so, it seems still more
conceivable that agencies' pre-existing level of analysis behind guidance documents will often satisfy
OMB, thus rendering E.O. 13,422's new requirement largely superfluous.

56
JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY : WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY
Do IT, at xi (1 989) ("After all these decades of wrestling with the subject, I have come to have grave
doubts that anything worth calling 'organization theory' will ever exist.").
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